Why Big Health Insurance Supported Obamacare, Part II

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 Why the Health Insurance Industry Supported Obamacare [14:52m]: Play Now | Play in Popup | Download (15)

The fact that the health insurance industry supported Obamacare from the very beginning was entirely missed by the mainstream press. This is perhaps understandable, since a) the mainstream press does not understand the dynamics of the healthcare system, and b) during the Obamacare drama, the health insurance companies had been assigned, and had graciously accepted, their vital role as the Forces of Evil. To the famously credulous members of the mainstream press, it was easy to imagine that the insurers were actually among the opposition.

But the insurance industry supported Obamacare from the start – and even before the start. During the Presidential race of 2008, for instance, managed care companies donated far more money to both Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton than to any Republican candidate, even though both of these Democratic candidates publicly castigated the insurance companies for producing most of the problems in American healthcare, and promised to institute reforms that would drastically cramp their style and reduce their profits.

Why would the insurance industry support the very candidates whose chief healthcare strategy was to demonize them? Quite simply, it was because the insurance industry had nowhere else to go.

By the time Mr. Obama became president, the once proud, self-confident, and even arrogant American health insurance industry had been completely humbled. Like the old Soviet Union twenty years earlier, it still may have looked formidable from the outside, but it was really an empty shell.  The industry had run out its string; it was entirely bereft of ideas. Its business model was completely broken, and it desperately needed an exit strategy. And it was due to the need to find a serviceable exit strategy that the industry supported Obamacare.

To understand what landed the insurance industry in this sad state of affairs, it is necessary to review its recent history.

The Rise of the For-Profit HMOs

When the Clintons set out to reform the American healthcare system in 1993, the health insurance industry initially claimed to support them. The Clintons had promised them a vast new market – the millions of heretofore uninsured Americans whose premiums would be paid, presumably, by the government.

But the alliance fell apart the moment the insurance industry began reading the massive tome of regulations the Clintons finally produced, and found in it much they didn’t like. Chiefly, they they didn’t like the parts that ceded full control of their industry to the government. So Big Health Insurance immediately turned against the Clintons, and spent millions of dollars introducing us to Harry and Louise (a “typical” American husband and wife who were viewed in numerous TV commercials discovering various appalling provisions of the Clinton plan). In the end, when the Clinton’s reform plan went down to ignominious defeat, the powerful health insurance industry, appropriately, got most of the credit.

Most of us Americans were happy at the time that the Clintons’ plan had been defeated, but during the debate over healthcare reform we had become convinced that the old way of doing healthcare wasn’t any good either. The healthcare system, we all knew by now, was bankrupting us.  And something needed to be done about it. But with the Clinton plan off the table, what were our options?

In the ashes of the Clintons’ failed effort, the health insurers saw their golden opportunity.  And they presented the American people with a savior. The savior was, of course, them.

The insurance industry made its pitch in a new guise which we Americans had never seen before. For the big fee-for-service insurance companies had transformed themselves into HMOs, and had fully assimilated the language of managed care. These were not the touchy-feely, non-profit HMOs that had been puttering around in the healthcare system for a decade or so.  These were meat-and-potatoes, for-profit HMOs, run for the most part by hard-nosed business executives, and newly formulated for a new era of American healthcare.

And here is what they said: “Citizens! We all – employers, patients, physicians, hospitals, manufacturers and insurers – have just dodged a bullet. Thanks to us, the frightening socialist reforms of the Clintons have been soundly defeated. But where does this leave us? We stand now between Scylla and Charybdis, between the specter of nationalized healthcare on one hand, and the continued profligacy of traditional fee-for-service medicine on the other. And we cannot countenance either. But here,” they continued, “is a third way. A painless way, based on the sound principles of managed care, open markets, and free enterprise. Let healthcare become a business like any other business, and the market forces will find ways not only to cut costs but also to improve quality, and with no government intervention.”

The offer, in other words, was to turn healthcare over to the business professionals now running the New Model HMOs, who were cocky with the certainty that they could harness the efficiencies of the marketplace to control costs, make a big profit at the same time, and be feted as saviors to boot. Because we’re Americans and we know the benefits of capitalism, and because the other choices we faced looked even worse, we all said, “Go for it.”

This change led to the most rapid transformation the American healthcare system has ever seen, and within a few short years, the majority of Americans were enrolled in HMOs, or some other species of corporate managed care.

So HMO executives set out to control the cost of American healthcare, and to make a spectacular profit doing it. And for a few years, they seemed successful. Healthcare inflation slowed dramatically in the late 1990s, and HMO profits soared.

But it was all an illusion.

The Fall of the For-Profit HMOs

The initial impressive profitability of New Model HMOs was due to the one-time reduction in cost you always get when you implement efficiencies of scale (made possible by merging enterprises), and by instituting the new standardization techniques favored by managed care theory. These steps reduced the cost of healthcare for a while, but the underlying rate of healthcare inflation (which is mostly caused by new medical technologies and an aging population, neither of which are cured by managed care) was pretty much unchanged. So by the early 2000s, when these one-time cost reductions had been fully realized, healthcare inflation was right back on the same unsustainable trajectory it had been on before.

Unfortunately for the HMOs, the big profits they enjoyed throughout the 1990s could not last. Their rapidly expanding valuations were attributable not to their efficient management of healthcare, but instead, to the frenzy of mergers that rapidly ensued, and to the acquisition and privatization of not-for-profit public assets for a tiny fraction of their true value.

So not long after the turn of the century the for-profit managed care companies were getting very nervous. For the very first time in their history, HMOs were faced with the prospect of having to earn their profits, profits sufficient to satisfy their shareholders, by actually managing the healthcare of sick people. This is something they had never accomplished before, and, by the time the election of 2008 approached, they knew they never would.

By that time they had tried everything. Beginning in 1994, filled with confidence and enthusiasm and cheered on (initially, at least) by the public and by public officials alike, the health insurance companies had more than 15 years of more-or-less unfettered freedom to institute any efficiencies it wanted to. In the ensuing years insurance companies tried all kinds of legitimate ideas for reducing healthcare costs, such as managed care, gatekeepers, clinical pathways, disease management programs, pay for performance, wellness programs, medical homes, and even a ruthless consolidation of the industry to achieve “efficiencies of scale.”

They also tried every sneaky and underhanded idea they could think of for reducing costs, like cherry-picking the healthy patients, treating chronically ill patients like pariahs so they would go away, making access to specialty care as inconvenient as possible, forcing doctors to sign “gag clauses” to prevent them from telling their patients about certain treatment options, browbeating primary care physicians into zombie-like compliance with handed-down care directives, refusing to cover expensive-but-effective medical services, and canceling the policies of tens of thousands of patients after they get sick, based on trumped-up technicalities. Indeed, they tried everything short of dispatching teams of Ninjas in the dark of night to slaughter their most expensive subscribers in their beds.  And finally, when all else failed, they instituted huge and unsustainable annual increases in premiums, to the point of driving their customers out of the market. (This latter move, of course, was an open acknowledgment that the industry had entered its death spiral.)

All these efforts were to little avail. The cost of healthcare continued to skyrocket, entirely unabated. And by 2009, when President Obama began his push for healthcare reform, the insurance companies knew they had no prospect of long-term profitability. Their business model was no longer viable, and, while telling soothing stories to avoid shareholder panic, they were urgently casting about for an exit strategy.

A drowning man will cling to any piece of flotsam that comes his way.  What the insurance industry found floating by was Obamacare.

What Health Insurers  Get From Obamacare

In return for its support in the healthcare reform battle, President Obama offered the insurance industry the graceful exit strategy it so desperately needed.  Under Obamacare, for at least a few years the insurers hope to get One Last Windfall – namely, profits from the influx of previously-uninsured Americans whose premiums will be paid – or at least subsidized – by taxpayers.  Here, the insurers are relying on the likelihood that the inflow of new premiums will, for a year or two at least, greatly outweigh the outflow of money they will have to spend caring for these new subscribers. Obviously, they will use every trick in their well-worn book to stave off expenditures for these new subscribers for as long as they can, but if they actually knew how to avoid paying healthcare costs indefinitely, they wouldn’t be seeking a government bail-out today. In any case, an inflow of new subscribers will be a very temporary source of profit for insurers. Hence, at best it is One Last Windfall.

What happens to the insurers after they exhaust this last windfall is still up in the air. Obamacare may, of course, eventually transition to a single-payer system, an outcome which many conservatives desperately fear, and many liberals fervently desire. In this case, there may very well be some final compensatory buy-out (or a buy-off) for the insurance companies. But more likely, the insurance companies under Obamacare will continue to exist essentially as public utilities. That is, they will exist as companies chartered by the government, which administer healthcare under the direction of the government, with the products they may offer, the prices they may charge, the profits they may keep, and the losses they may incur, determined solely by the government.  It’s not glorious, but it’s a living.

And it’s much better than where they would have ended up without Obamacare. Which is why they supported it from the start.

Now that we know why the insurance industry supported Obamacare, in the next post we will explore how the industry, at no small cost to its own public image, supported the President when it counted most.

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Why Big Health Insurance Supported Obamacare

Part I – Another Reason He Should Have Kept the Bust

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Now, read the whole story.

DrRich explains it all in, Fixing American Healthcare – Wonkonians, Gekkonians and the Grand Unification Theory of Healthcare.

Now on Kindle!

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 More Evidence that Pay for Performance is Working [8:47m]: Play Now | Play in Popup | Download (37)

DrRich has long praised Pay For Performance as a particularly effective tool for covertly rationing healthcare.

Traditionally, pay-for-performance efforts (modeled after time-honored techniques used on trained seals), produce checklists of approved “activities,” which physicians of quality will always perform when engaged in a “patient encounter.” By examining filled-out checklists, the payers (both health insurance companies and the government) can thus determine which doctors are of sufficiently high quality to deserve their full reimbursement allotment, and which doctors are of substandard quality, and therefore deserve at least to have a portion of their reimbursement withheld, and possibly to be sent away for “re-education,” or to have their names published on a potentially embarrassing list.

When these pay-for-performance checklists are combined with the need to see one patient every 7.5 minutes, thus leaving no time for the discussion of health problems (or other issues) that the payers have not seen fit to include on their checklists, pay-for-performance becomes a very serviceable addition to the covert rationing armamentarium. Which brings us to the latest good news about the success of pay-for-performance.

This week, at Digestive Disease Week (the year’s major scientific gathering of gastroenterologists), doctors from Johns Hopkins will present a paper demonstrating that pay-for-performance reimbursement schemes create financial incentives for surgeons to shun obese patients.

Under this species of pay-for-performance, surgeons are “rewarded” (i.e., not punished) for meeting specified quality standards which have to do with certain patient outcomes. (For pay-for-performance to occasionally equate quality with outcomes is a particularly useful formulation, since expressing reservations about such pay-for-performance measures immediately brands one as being against good medical outcomes, in the same way that being concerned about illegal immigration brands one as being against immigrants, or having reservations about certain of President Obama’s policies brands one as being a racist.)

The Johns Hopkins researchers have found that performing surgical procedures on obese patients results in substantially more complications than performing the same surgical procedures on non-obese patients. For instance, fat people had 27% more complications after gall bladder surgery, and 11% more complications after appendectomy, than thinner people. They also had substantially longer hospital stays, and generated much larger medical bills. The researchers conclude that surgeons (some of whom are literate and understand rudimentary statistics, and therefore not only have access to this kind of information, but are also capable of processing it to at least some extent) can only conclude that, in order to maintain a viable surgical practice, they will need to avoid operating on obese patients. At the very least, they will need to avoid doing elective surgery on fat people, waiting instead until they are in extremis, and require emergency surgery (since at least some effort is made to “adjust” the expected outcomes in these situations).

This result, of course, is similar to the result DrRich reported some time ago regarding the publication of Physician Report Cards. Namely, thanks to publicly-available report cards, cardiologists in the state of New York have been more reluctant than cardiologists in other states to aggressively treat patients with severe heart attacks, and as a result (while the report cards are cleaner) the mortality of these patients is higher in New York.

And the situation with surgeons being quite similar (i.e., doctors being incented to avoid treating higher-risk patients, for fear of being punished because of an unavoidably higher rate of complications), DrRich feels quite confident in offering his surgical friends the same advice he offered the New York cardiologists. Namely, he suggests the Designated Driver strategy.

The Designated Driver strategy requires the Chief of Surgery (ideally, an imposing and feared figure) to approach a promising young surgeon who is just entering practice after the end of a very long course of training, and saying, “Son, you are going to have a brief but spectacular career. You are going to be our Designated Driver.”

For an extraordinary annual salary and immediate vesting in a generous pension plan, this young surgeon is going to have the honor of being the one who gets all the high-risk surgical cases for the group. He will agree to do this as long as it is feasible, that is, as long as he’s not run out of practice because his pay-for performance reports, or his physician report card, have become so abysmally bad. With careful management, and with his colleagues tossing him a few “easy” cases now and then in order to extend his longevity, he may be able to survive as a surgeon for five or ten years (longer, for instance, than the average NFL player), after which he can enjoy a lucrative retirement, or simply change careers. (There are obviously other approaches for conducting the Designated Driver strategy, for instance, as a way for surgeons nearing retirement age to go out in a blaze of glory. But you get the idea.)

The Designator Driver strategy is a win-win for everyone except the government – so surely it will eventually become illegal. But what doctors have to realize, when practicing medicine in a healthcare system driven by the covert rationing imperative, is that one either gives in to the bizarre incentives created by programs like pay-for-performance (which will cause measurable harm to their patients), or one fights back guerrilla-style, striking where one can, and changing tactics as the enemy adjusts.

To the government, however, such guerrilla activities amount to a mere nuisance, an annoyance which (like the poor and the uninsured) will always be with us. Looking at the big picture, our government will doubtless rejoice to hear the Johns Hopkins research results. The Feds will be particularly pleased to learn that their pay-for-performance efforts are achieving both of the desired effects (i.e., reducing the volume of elective surgical procedures, and advancing prospects for demonizing and discriminating against the obese.

Say what you will about pay-for-performance. It’s working.

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 PCPs: Here's All You Need To Know About Our New Healthcare System [14:47m]: Play Now | Play in Popup | Download (3)

DrRich has decided it is time to begin studying the 2700-page healthcare reform bill that the Senate passed on December 24, as that is the bill which will actually become the law of the land. In the fall, DrRich had spent quite a bit of time with the House bill. This was such a painful and useless exercise that DrRich decided he would not waste any more of his time with proposed legislation, but instead (as Nancy Pelosi has wisely suggested) would wait until Congress passed a bill so he could find out what’s in it.

Now, DrRich does not have the stamina to study the new law all at once, as a whole. He must bite off little pieces. And the first thing he sought in embarking on his study of our new healthcare system was evidence of how the new law would rescue the Primary Care Physician.

This is important, since everyone acknowledges that we have a severe shortage of PCPs already, and when we add 32 million Americans to the rolls of the insured, that shortage will become extremely acute. Further, we know that very few medical school graduates are deciding to become PCPs, and further, that the PCPs who are in practice today are becoming older rapidly, and many may not be around in 10 years (or even in 10 months, once this reform bill passes).

As we all have heard, our President and his Congress have explicitly recognized the problem, and have frequently explicated on the need to build up and support our beleaguered primary care workforce. They have promised that their healthcare reforms will aggressively address this issue. And it is largely due to this promise that prominent physician organizations, like the AMA (which really represents a relatively small minority of the medical profession) and the American College of Physicians (which represents a large proportion of internists, of whom many are PCPs), have come out in support of the President’s reform efforts.

DrRich believes, of course, that for the Feds to suddenly make themselves the champions of PCPs, after spending nearly two decades systematically rendering primary care medicine a completely untenable proposition for American physicians, would be an unlikely outcome for any reform bill. Just to remind his readers, here’s what DrRich has previously observed about the carefully engineered plight of the American PCP:

“Their pay is determined arbitrarily by Acts of Congress, not by what they’re worth to their patients or to the market, and indeed in this way PCPs have a lot in common with workers in the old Soviet collectives.

They are directed to “practice medicine” by guidelines and directives which are handed down from on high; guidelines which, being forcibly based on what is called “evidence-based medicine,” necessarily address the average response of some large group of patients to the treatment being considered and do not allow much if any latitude for an individual patient’s needs; and which are often promulgated less to assure the excellent care of patients and more to further the agenda of various and competing interest groups, professional, governmental and otherwise.

They are limited to between 7.5 and 12.5 minutes per patient encounter (depending on the third party that controls a given patient’s medical care), and the content of what must occur during those 7.5 minutes is strictly determined by sundry Pay for Performance checklists, so as to strictly limit any interchanges between doctor and patient that do not meet the approved agenda for such encounters.

Their every move must be carefully documented according to incomprehensible rules, on innumerable forms and documents, that confound patient care but that greatly further the convenience of healthcare accountants and other stone-witted bureaucrats who are employed specifically to second-guess every clinical decision and every action the PCP takes.

They are expected to operate flawlessly under a system of federal rules, regulations and guidelines that cover hundreds of thousands of pages in immeasurable volumes that are never available in any readily accessible form. If they do not operate flawlessly according to those rules, regulations and guidelines, they are guilty of the federal crime of healthcare fraud. Furthermore, the specific meanings of these rules, regulations and guidelines are not merely opaque and difficult to ascertain, but indeed they are fundamentally indeterminate – that is, no individual or group of individuals in existence can say what they mean. So, PCPs operate under a massive quantum cloud of rules as best they can, but their actual status (regarding healthcare fraud) is, like Schrodinger’s cat, fundamentally unknowable – until the “box is opened” (typically through criminal prosecution), whereupon the meaning of the rules is finally crystallized in a court of law, and doctors who had been practicing in good faith find that they have at least a 50- 50 chance (like the cat) of learning that they are actually professionally dead.

Worst of all, PCPs have been charged with the duty of covertly rationing their patients’ healthcare at the bedside, and they have been pressed to nullify the classic doctor-patient relationship, by the healthcare bureaucracy that determines their professional viability, by the United States Supreme Court, and by the bankrupt, new-age ethical precepts of their own profession.”

How does our new healthcare law propose to “fix” these problems? DrRich can find two proposed solutions in the Senate bill.

First, the new law promises to address some of the pay discrepancy which punishes doctors for going into primary care specialties. It is unclear to DrRich how much this new pay fix will bring to PCPs. He will merely observe that, until now, the Feds have intentionally rendered primary care medicine such a soul-wrenching, personally and professionally demeaning endeavor that it has pushed most PCPs beyond mere anger, frustration, or resignation. Many of them are desperately looking for any practicable exit strategy. And to DrRich’s thinking, since it is not primarily their relatively low income that has caused all this anguish, a mere boost in income cannot overcome it.

But, of course, that’s for the PCPs themselves to decide.

Second, the new law proposes to fund new training opportunities for PCPs. This also sounds nice. But DrRich wonders what effect these new training programs will have, when the training programs that already exist cannot come close to filling their slots.

DrRich contends that these two stated “fixes” for manufacturing more PCPs cannot possibly provide an actual solution to the PCP shortage, and further, that the authors of the Senate bill cannot possibly believe they will. And so, DrRich decided to look a little deeper.

The answer to the PCP shortage – at least, the answer our political leaders are actually relying upon – is revealed deep in the Senate bill, in Section 5501, where the definition of “Primary Care Practitioner” is actually provided. Note, first of all, that once this bill becomes the law of the land, “PCP” will no longer mean “primary care physician,” but rather, will mean “primary care practitioner.”

And here’s how the new law defines Primary Care Practioners:

The term ‘primary care practitioner’ means an individual who —

(I) is a physician (as described in section 1861(r)(1)) who has a primary specialty designation of family medicine, internal medicine, geriatric medicine, or pediatric medicine; or

(II) is a nurse practitioner, clinical nurse specialist, or physician assistant (as those terms are defined in 9 section 1861(aa)(5))

And so, to his readers who are primary care physicians, DrRich must report that the real “fix” your political leaders have envisioned for the PCP shortage has been to declare you and nurse practitioners to be functionally (and legally) equivalent. This, DrRich submits, is all you need to know.

Having painstakingly reduced you unfortunate practitioners of primary care medicine to tools of the state – whose job is to follow the guidelines and place chits on the checklists which are handed down from on high, and to fill out the electronic forms which are designed not to advance patient care but to convenience the healthcare accountants who will thereby judge your “quality” – it is only natural for the central authority to eventually notice that you really don’t need all that training to do the kind of job they have invented for you. Nurses – who can be “trained up” much more rapidly than you, who will work for much less money than you, and who (they think) will be much less recalcitrant about following handed-down directives than you – will fill the gap. And you, doctor, can go pound salt.

DrRich must hasten to add, by the way, that, regarding the nurse practitioners, he believes the Feds have miscalculated. DrRich knows a lot of nurse practitioners and greatly admires their professionalism. He believes that “PCP” has been so successfully demeaned that many fewer nurse practitioners than our political leaders think will actually jump at the opportunity to become one (especially when you take into account the liability you assume when you become a PCP in a non-tort-reform paradigm like the one our leaders have made for us). Trusting in their common sense, DrRich will leave the nurse practitioners to their own wise counsel.

To his primary care physician friends, who have bravely held on, clinging to the promises made by our political leaders that their noble efforts will not go unrewarded, and to the assurances made by their own professional organizations that all will be well once the system is reformed, DrRich is forced to say: Told you so.

He also reminds you that it is still not illegal to opt out, and urges you to consider that it soon might be.